容器安全完整指南
容器安全是云原生安全的核心组成部分，涵盖从镜像构建到运行时监控的完整生命周期。容器技术在带来灵活性和可移植性的同时，也引入了新的安全挑战，需要建立系统性的安全防护体系。
🛡️ 容器安全生命周期
安全左移策略
yaml
development_security:
secure_coding_practices:
base_image_selection:
criteria:
- "官方镜像优先选择"
- "最小化基础镜像"
- "定期更新维护"
- "已知漏洞数量"
recommended_images:
distroless: "Google Distroless镜像"
alpine: "Alpine Linux镜像"
scratch: "空白镜像(静态编译)"
chainguard: "Chainguard强化镜像"
evaluation_matrix: |
镜像类型 | 安全性 | 大小 | 维护性 | 兼容性
----------|--------|------|--------|-------
Distroless| 高 | 小 | 高 | 中
Alpine | 高 | 小 | 高 | 高
Ubuntu | 中 | 大 | 高 | 高
CentOS | 中 | 大 | 中 | 高
Scratch | 最高 | 最小 | 低 | 低
dockerfile_security:
best_practices:
- "多阶段构建减少攻击面"
- "非root用户运行"
- "最小权限原则"
- "敏感信息处理"
secure_dockerfile: |
# 安全的Dockerfile示例
# 多阶段构建
FROM node:16-alpine AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY package*.json ./
RUN npm ci --only=production
# 运行时镜像
FROM gcr.io/distroless/nodejs:16
# 创建非root用户
USER 1001:1001
# 复制应用文件
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder --chown=1001:1001 /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --chown=1001:1001 src/ ./src/
# 健康检查
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
CMD node healthcheck.js
# 启动应用
EXPOSE 3000
CMD ["src/index.js"]
anti_patterns: |
# 应避免的不安全实践
# ❌ 以root用户运行
USER root
# ❌ 安装不必要的包
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl vim nano
# ❌ 硬编码敏感信息
ENV DATABASE_PASSWORD=supersecret
# ❌ 复制整个文件系统
COPY . .
# ❌ 使用latest标签
FROM ubuntu:latest
# ❌ 不清理包管理缓存
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y package
secret_management:
buildtime_secrets:
docker_buildkit: |
# 使用BuildKit处理构建时密钥
# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1.4
FROM alpine
RUN --mount=type=secret,id=api_key \
API_KEY=$(cat /run/secrets/api_key) && \
echo "Using API key for build process"
# 构建命令
# echo "secret_api_key" | docker build --secret id=api_key,src=- .
multistage_cleanup: |
# 多阶段构建清理密钥
FROM alpine AS secrets
COPY secrets.txt /tmp/
FROM alpine AS final
COPY --from=secrets /tmp/processed_data /app/
# 密钥不会包含在最终镜像中
runtime_secrets:
kubernetes_secrets: |
# Kubernetes Secret挂载
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: app-secrets
type: Opaque
data:
database-password: <base64-encoded>
api-key: <base64-encoded>
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: secure-app
spec:
template:
spec:
containers:
- name: app
image: myapp:v1.0
env:
- name: DB_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: app-secrets
key: database-password
volumeMounts:
- name: api-certs
mountPath: /etc/ssl/certs
readOnly: true
volumes:
- name: api-certs
secret:
secretName: app-secrets
items:
- key: api-key
path: api.key
external_secrets: |
# External Secrets Operator
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: vault-secret
spec:
refreshInterval: 15s
secretStoreRef:
name: vault-backend
kind: SecretStore
target:
name: app-secret
creationPolicy: Owner
data:
- secretKey: password
remoteRef:
key: secret/database
property: password
supply_chain_security:
image_provenance:
sbom_generation:
description: "软件物料清单生成"
tools:
- "Syft (Anchore)"
- "Trivy SBOM"
- "Docker Buildx"
- "SPDX格式"
implementation: |
# Syft SBOM生成
syft packages docker:myapp:latest -o spdx-json > myapp-sbom.json
# Docker Buildx SBOM
docker buildx build --sbom=true -t myapp:latest .
# 集成到CI/CD
stages:
- name: Generate SBOM
script:
- syft packages $IMAGE_NAME -o spdx-json > sbom.json
- grype sbom:sbom.json # 漏洞扫描
image_signing:
cosign_implementation: |
# Cosign镜像签名
# 生成密钥对
cosign generate-key-pair
# 签名镜像
cosign sign --key cosign.key myregistry/myapp:v1.0
# 验证签名
cosign verify --key cosign.pub myregistry/myapp:v1.0
# Kubernetes准入控制器验证
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: cosign-verification
data:
policy.yaml: |
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: ClusterImagePolicy
metadata:
name: require-signed-images
spec:
images:
- glob: "myregistry/**"
authorities:
- key:
data: |
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE...
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
notary_v2: |
# Notary v2 (TUF)实现
# 初始化仓库
notation cert generate-test "wabbit-networks.io"
notation sign myregistry/myapp:v1.0
# 验证策略
{
"version": "1.0",
"trustPolicies": [
{
"name": "wabbit-networks-images",
"registryScopes": [ "myregistry/myapp" ],
"signatureVerification": {
"level": "strict"
},
"trustStores": ["ca:wabbit-networks.io"],
"trustedIdentities": ["*"]
}
]
}
dependency_management:
vulnerability_scanning:
continuous_monitoring: |
# 持续漏洞监控流水线
name: Container Security Scan
on:
push:
branches: [main]
schedule:
- cron: '0 6 * * *' # 每日扫描
jobs:
security-scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Build image
run: docker build -t ${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.sha }} .
- name: Run Trivy vulnerability scanner
uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
with:
image-ref: ${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.sha }}
format: 'sarif'
output: 'trivy-results.sarif'
- name: Upload Trivy scan results
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v2
with:
sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'
- name: Security gate
run: |
CRITICAL=$(trivy image --severity CRITICAL --format json ${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.sha }} | jq '.Results[].Vulnerabilities | length')
if [ "$CRITICAL" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "Critical vulnerabilities found: $CRITICAL"
exit 1
fi
license_compliance:
automated_checking: |
# 许可证合规检查
# FOSSA扫描
fossa analyze
fossa test
# License Finder
license_finder --decisions-file=doc/dependency_decisions.yml
# Scancode Toolkit
scancode --license --copyright --summary myproject/
update_automation:
dependabot_config: |
# .github/dependabot.yml
version: 2
updates:
- package-ecosystem: "docker"
directory: "/"
schedule:
interval: "weekly"
open-pull-requests-limit: 10
reviewers:
- "security-team"
labels:
- "security"
- "dependencies"
renovate_config: |
# renovate.json
{
"extends": ["config:base"],
"dockerfile": {
"enabled": true
},
"vulnerabilityAlerts": {
"enabled": true
},
"osvVulnerabilityAlerts": true,
"separateMinorPatch": true,
"prConcurrentLimit": 3
}yaml
build_security:
secure_build_environment:
build_isolation:
principles:
- "隔离的构建环境"
- "最小权限构建用户"
- "临时性构建实例"
- "构建缓存安全"
implementation: |
# GitHub Actions安全构建
name: Secure Build
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
security-events: write
steps:
- name: Harden Runner
uses: step-security/harden-runner@v2
with:
egress-policy: audit
allowed-endpoints: >
api.github.com:443
github.com:443
registry-1.docker.io:443
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Build with security scanning
run: |
# 构建镜像
docker build -t temp-image .
# 立即扫描
trivy image --exit-code 1 --severity HIGH,CRITICAL temp-image
build_attestation:
slsa_provenance: |
# SLSA构建证明
name: SLSA Generic generator
on:
workflow_call:
inputs:
image:
required: true
type: string
jobs:
build:
outputs:
image: ${{ steps.image.outputs.image }}
digest: ${{ steps.image.outputs.digest }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Build image
id: image
run: |
docker build -t ${{ inputs.image }} .
DIGEST=$(docker inspect --format='{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' ${{ inputs.image }})
echo "digest=${DIGEST}" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
provenance:
needs: [build]
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
actions: read
uses: slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_container_slsa3.yml@v1.7.0
with:
image: ${{ needs.build.outputs.image }}
digest: ${{ needs.build.outputs.digest }}
in_toto_attestation: |
# in-toto软件供应链证明
in-toto-run --step-name build \
--products myapp \
--key build-key.pem \
-- docker build -t myapp .
in-toto-run --step-name test \
--materials myapp \
--products test-results.xml \
--key test-key.pem \
-- pytest tests/
# 验证供应链
in-toto-verify --verification-key release-key.pem \
--layout root.layout \
--link-dir .
registry_security:
harbor_configuration:
vulnerability_scanning: |
# Harbor项目配置
{
"project_name": "secure-apps",
"metadata": {
"auto_scan": "true",
"severity": "high",
"reuse_sys_cve_allowlist": "false",
"retention_policy": {
"rules": [{
"disabled": false,
"action": "retain",
"template": "always",
"tag_selectors": [{
"kind": "doublestar",
"decoration": "matches",
"pattern": "release-**"
}],
"scope_selectors": [{
"kind": "repository",
"decoration": "repoMatches",
"pattern": "**"
}]
}]
}
}
}
access_control: |
# Harbor RBAC配置
# 项目级权限
- 项目管理员: 完全控制权限
- 开发者: 推送/拉取权限
- 访客: 仅拉取权限
# 机器人账户
robot_account:
name: "ci-robot"
permissions:
- "push"
- "pull"
expires_at: "2024-12-31T23:59:59Z"
content_trust:
docker_content_trust: |
# Docker Content Trust配置
export DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1
export DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST_SERVER=https://notary.example.com
# 初始化仓库
docker trust key generate mykey
docker trust signer add --key mykey.pub myuser myregistry/myapp
# 签名推送
docker push myregistry/myapp:v1.0
# 验证拉取
docker pull myregistry/myapp:v1.0
verification_policy: |
# Kubernetes镜像策略
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: image-policy
data:
policy.json: |
{
"default": [
{
"type": "reject"
}
],
"transports": {
"docker": {
"myregistry.com": [
{
"type": "signedBy",
"keyType": "GPGKeys",
"keyPath": "/etc/pki/trust.gpg"
}
]
}
}
}
ci_cd_integration:
security_gates:
quality_gates: |
# GitLab CI安全门禁
security_scan:
stage: security
image: aquasec/trivy:latest
script:
- trivy filesystem --exit-code 1 --severity HIGH,CRITICAL .
- trivy image --exit-code 1 --severity HIGH,CRITICAL $CI_REGISTRY_IMAGE:$CI_COMMIT_SHA
artifacts:
reports:
container_scanning: trivy-report.json
rules:
- if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "main"
- if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
policy_check:
stage: security
image: openpolicyagent/conftest:latest
script:
- conftest verify --policy docker-security.rego Dockerfile
- conftest test --policy k8s-security.rego k8s/
rules:
- exists:
- Dockerfile
- k8s/*.yaml
automated_remediation: |
# 自动化修复流程
vulnerability_remediation:
stage: remediation
script:
- |
# 检查可修复漏洞
FIXABLE=$(trivy image --format json $IMAGE | jq '.Results[].Vulnerabilities[] | select(.FixedVersion != "") | .VulnerabilityID' | wc -l)
if [ "$FIXABLE" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "Found $FIXABLE fixable vulnerabilities"
# 创建修复PR
git checkout -b "security/fix-vulnerabilities-$(date +%Y%m%d)"
# 更新基础镜像
sed -i 's/FROM alpine:3.14/FROM alpine:3.16/' Dockerfile
# 提交并创建PR
git add Dockerfile
git commit -m "Security: Update base image to fix vulnerabilities"
git push origin HEAD
# 创建PR（使用API）
curl -X POST \
-H "Authorization: token $GITHUB_TOKEN" \
-d '{"title":"Security: Fix container vulnerabilities","head":"security/fix-vulnerabilities-$(date +%Y%m%d)","base":"main"}' \
https://api.github.com/repos/$CI_PROJECT_PATH/pulls
fi
when: on_failure
only:
- schedules🔍 容器运行时安全
运行时威胁检测
yaml
runtime_monitoring:
behavioral_analysis:
process_monitoring:
falco_rules: |
# Falco运行时检测规则
- rule: Shell in container
desc: Detect shell execution in container
condition: >
spawned_process and container and
shell_procs and proc.tty != 0
output: >
Shell spawned in container
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
priority: WARNING
- rule: File below etc opened for writing
desc: Detect attempt to write to /etc directory
condition: >
open_write and container and
fd.filename startswith /etc
output: >
File below /etc opened for writing
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
priority: ERROR
- rule: Unexpected outbound connection
desc: Detect unexpected outbound network connection
condition: >
outbound and container and
not fd.sport in (http_port, https_port, dns_port) and
not fd.dip in (allowed_outbound_ips)
output: >
Unexpected outbound connection
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline dest=%fd.dip port=%fd.dport container_id=%container.id)
priority: WARNING
custom_rules: |
# 自定义安全规则
- rule: Cryptocurrency Mining Detection
desc: Detect potential cryptocurrency mining activity
condition: >
spawned_process and container and
(proc.name in (cryptomining_processes) or
proc.cmdline contains "stratum" or
proc.cmdline contains "mining")
output: >
Potential cryptocurrency mining detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline container_id=%container.id)
priority: CRITICAL
- rule: Privilege Escalation Attempt
desc: Detect attempts to escalate privileges
condition: >
spawned_process and container and
(proc.name in (privilege_escalation_binaries) or
proc.cmdline contains "sudo" or
proc.cmdline contains "su -")
output: >
Privilege escalation attempt detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline container_id=%container.id)
priority: HIGH
network_monitoring:
istio_security_policies: |
# Istio安全策略监控
apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: AuthorizationPolicy
metadata:
name: deny-suspicious-traffic
namespace: production
spec:
rules:
- to:
- operation:
methods: ["GET", "POST"]
- when:
- key: source.ip
notValues: ["10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16"]
then:
- key: custom.action
values: ["DENY"]
network_policies: |
# Kubernetes网络策略
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-all
namespace: production
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-frontend-backend
namespace: production
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: backend
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: frontend
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
- from: []
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8090 # 健康检查端口
container_isolation:
security_contexts:
secure_pod_config: |
# 安全的Pod配置
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: secure-app
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
runAsGroup: 1000
fsGroup: 1000
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
supplementalGroups: [1000]
containers:
- name: app
image: myapp:v1.0
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
add:
- NET_BIND_SERVICE # 仅添加必需的能力
resources:
limits:
cpu: "1"
memory: "512Mi"
ephemeral-storage: "1Gi"
requests:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "128Mi"
ephemeral-storage: "100Mi"
volumeMounts:
- name: tmp-volume
mountPath: /tmp
- name: cache-volume
mountPath: /app/cache
volumes:
- name: tmp-volume
emptyDir: {}
- name: cache-volume
emptyDir: {}
pod_security_standards: |
# Pod Security Standards配置
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: secure-workloads
labels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted
# 自定义PSS策略
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: pss-policy
data:
policy: |
apiVersion: pod-security.kubernetes.io/v1beta1
kind: PodSecurityPolicy
metadata:
name: restricted-psp
spec:
privileged: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
requiredDropCapabilities:
- ALL
volumes:
- configMap
- emptyDir
- projected
- secret
- downwardAPI
- persistentVolumeClaim
runAsUser:
rule: MustRunAsNonRoot
seLinux:
rule: RunAsAny
fsGroup:
rule: RunAsAny
runtime_protection:
gvisor_integration: |
# gVisor运行时配置
apiVersion: node.k8s.io/v1
kind: RuntimeClass
metadata:
name: gvisor
handler: runsc
overhead:
podFixed:
memory: "20Mi"
cpu: "10m"
scheduling:
nodeClassForScheduling: "gvisor-nodes"
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: secure-pod
spec:
runtimeClassName: gvisor
containers:
- name: app
image: myapp:v1.0
kata_containers: |
# Kata Containers配置
apiVersion: node.k8s.io/v1
kind: RuntimeClass
metadata:
name: kata
handler: kata
overhead:
podFixed:
memory: "130Mi"
cpu: "250m"
---
# 使用Kata运行时的Pod
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: isolated-pod
spec:
runtimeClassName: kata
containers:
- name: app
image: untrusted-app:latestyaml
threat_response:
automated_response:
policy_enforcement: |
# OPA Gatekeeper自动响应
apiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh/v1beta1
kind: ConstraintTemplate
metadata:
name: k8srequiredsecuritycontext
spec:
crd:
spec:
names:
kind: K8sRequiredSecurityContext
validation:
properties:
runAsNonRoot:
type: boolean
targets:
- target: admission.k8s.gatekeeper.sh
rego: |
package k8srequiredsecuritycontext
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
not container.securityContext.runAsNonRoot
msg := "Container must run as non-root user"
}
violation[{"msg": msg}] {
container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
container.securityContext.privileged
msg := "Container must not run in privileged mode"
}
incident_response: |
# 事件响应自动化
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: security-incident-response
spec:
template:
spec:
containers:
- name: responder
image: security-tools:latest
command:
- /bin/bash
- -c
- |
# 检测到安全事件时的响应动作
# 1. 隔离受影响的Pod
kubectl delete pod $COMPROMISED_POD --grace-period=0
# 2. 阻止网络访问
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: quarantine-${INCIDENT_ID}
namespace: ${NAMESPACE}
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
incident-id: ${INCIDENT_ID}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
EOF
# 3. 收集证据
kubectl logs $COMPROMISED_POD --previous > /evidence/pod-logs.txt
kubectl describe pod $COMPROMISED_POD > /evidence/pod-details.txt
# 4. 通知安全团队
curl -X POST -H 'Content-type: application/json' \
--data '{"text":"Security incident detected: '"$INCIDENT_DESCRIPTION"'"}' \
$SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL
restartPolicy: Never
forensic_analysis:
evidence_collection: |
# 容器取证工具
#!/bin/bash
CONTAINER_ID=$1
EVIDENCE_DIR="/tmp/evidence-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"
mkdir -p $EVIDENCE_DIR
# 收集容器信息
docker inspect $CONTAINER_ID > $EVIDENCE_DIR/container-info.json
docker logs $CONTAINER_ID > $EVIDENCE_DIR/container-logs.txt
# 收集进程信息
docker exec $CONTAINER_ID ps aux > $EVIDENCE_DIR/processes.txt
# 收集网络连接
docker exec $CONTAINER_ID netstat -tuln > $EVIDENCE_DIR/network-connections.txt
# 收集文件系统变更
docker diff $CONTAINER_ID > $EVIDENCE_DIR/filesystem-changes.txt
# 内存转储 (如果可能)
if command -v gcore >/dev/null 2>&1; then
PID=$(docker inspect -f '{{.State.Pid}}' $CONTAINER_ID)
gcore -o $EVIDENCE_DIR/memory-dump $PID
fi
# 创建证据包
tar -czf evidence-$CONTAINER_ID.tar.gz $EVIDENCE_DIR
echo "Evidence collected in evidence-$CONTAINER_ID.tar.gz"
timeline_reconstruction: |
# 时间线重建脚本
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import json
import subprocess
from datetime import datetime
def collect_timeline_events(container_id):
events = []
# Docker事件
result = subprocess.run(['docker', 'events', '--since', '1h', '--filter', f'container={container_id}', '--format', '{{.Time}} {{.Action}} {{.Actor.Attributes.name}}'],
capture_output=True, text=True)
for line in result.stdout.split('\n'):
if line.strip():
parts = line.split(' ', 2)
events.append({
'timestamp': parts[0],
'event_type': 'docker',
'action': parts[1],
'details': parts[2] if len(parts) > 2 else ''
})
# 系统调用日志 (如果有sysdig)
try:
result = subprocess.run(['sysdig', '-r', f'/tmp/{container_id}.scap', '-c', 'topprocs_cpu'],
capture_output=True, text=True)
# 解析sysdig输出...
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
# 按时间排序
events.sort(key=lambda x: x['timestamp'])
return events
def generate_report(events, output_file):
with open(output_file, 'w') as f:
f.write("Security Incident Timeline Report\n")
f.write("=" * 40 + "\n\n")
for event in events:
f.write(f"[{event['timestamp']}] {event['event_type']}: {event['action']}\n")
if event['details']:
f.write(f" Details: {event['details']}\n")
f.write("\n")
if __name__ == "__main__":
import sys
if len(sys.argv) != 2:
print("Usage: timeline_reconstruction.py <container_id>")
sys.exit(1)
container_id = sys.argv[1]
events = collect_timeline_events(container_id)
generate_report(events, f"timeline-{container_id}.txt")📋 容器安全面试重点
基础概念类
容器与传统虚拟化的安全差异？
- 共享内核的安全风险
- 容器逃逸攻击向量
- 隔离机制对比
- 攻击面分析
容器安全生命周期的关键阶段？
- 开发阶段安全左移
- 构建阶段供应链安全
- 运行时威胁检测
- 事件响应和取证
Docker安全的最佳实践？
- 最小化基础镜像
- 非root用户运行
- 只读文件系统
- 安全上下文配置
威胁检测类
如何检测容器逃逸攻击？
- 行为异常监控
- 系统调用分析
- 进程树异常
- 文件系统监控
容器运行时安全监控工具？
- Falco规则引擎
- Sysdig监控分析
- Aqua运行时保护
- Twistlock安全扫描
供应链攻击的防护策略？
- 镜像签名验证
- SBOM软件清单
- 依赖漏洞扫描
- 可信构建环境
技术实现类
Kubernetes Pod安全配置？
- SecurityContext设置
- Pod Security Standards
- 网络策略配置
- 资源限制设置
容器镜像安全扫描实现？
- 静态漏洞扫描
- 动态行为分析
- 恶意软件检测
- 配置错误检查
容器隔离技术对比？
- gVisor用户空间内核
- Kata Containers虚拟化
- Firecracker微虚拟机
- 传统Linux容器
🔗 相关内容
- 容器镜像安全扫描 - 详细的镜像扫描技术和工具
- 容器运行时安全 - 运行时监控和威胁检测
- 云原生安全基础 - 云原生安全整体架构
- Kubernetes安全 - K8s安全配置
容器安全是云原生安全的基石，需要从开发、构建、部署到运行的全生命周期进行安全防护。通过实施分层防御策略、持续监控和自动化响应，可以有效保护容器化应用免受各种安全威胁。